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1961] CASE COMMENTS 329
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR BREACH OF A
NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
In the case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills' the Su-
preme Court held that section 3o of the Taft-Hartley Act2 authorizes
either a union or an employer to sue in a federal court for specific
performance of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining con-
tract. This holding gave substance to the intent of Congress that both
parties to a bargaining agreement are bound to their contractual ob-
ligations. 3 The problem has arisen, however, whether the Lincoln
Mills doctrine empowers federal courts to enjoin a strike by a union
in violation of a no-strike clause, i.e., may section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act be interpreted so as to imply an exception to the cate-
gorical ban contained in section 4(a)4 of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia
Act on enjoining peaceful strikes.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louis-
iana was faced with this problem in the recent case of Baltimore Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Carpenters' Dist. Council5 Binding contracts contain-
ing no-strike clauses were in existence between the plaintiff and the
defendant unions.6 The Carpenters' Union threatened a strike which,
if carried out, would have constituted a breach of contract; thereupon
the plaintiff petitioned the federal court to enjoin the threatened
strike. The court denied the petition stating that the plain language
'353 U-s. 418 (1957).
-Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 3oi(a), 61 Stat. 156
017), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958): "Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
plo~er and a labor organization representing emplo~ees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.",
'S. Rep. No. io5, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 17 (1947): *'Statutory recognition of the
collectihe agreement as a valid, binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and nec-
essary step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such
agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace."
'Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4(a), 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1958): "No
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in con-
cert, an) of the follo%%ing acts:
"(a) Ceasing or refising to perform in-, work or to remain in any relation of
emplowinent ... "
r188 F. Supp, 382 (E.D. La. 196o).
"Id. at 382 11.1.
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of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ruled out such injunctive
relief.
7
The plaintiff's argument was based on three separate grounds:
(1) the decision in several railway cases wherein the provision of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act banning injunctions was lifted in order to
reconcile the earlier and more general Norris-LaGuardia Act with the
later and more specific Railway .Labor Act; s (2) the holding in
Lincoln Mills that the procedural requirements of section 79' of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act may be dispensed with in a suit under 3o
of the Taft-Hartley Act for a mandatory injunction to compel ar-
bitration; 10 (3) a statement in Lincoln Mills to the effect that the ar-
bitration clause is the quid pro quo given by the employer in return
for the no-strike agreement by the union." Heavy reliance was placed,
in elaborating upon this last ground, on the theory that if the former
is specifically enforceable then the latter should be specifically en-
forceable as well.1
2
The court rejected these arguments, holding: (i) the exceptions to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act were made in the Railway Labor Act
cases because of specific provisions in the Railway Act (a) for com-
pulsory arbitration of "minor disputes" and (b) to make the decision
of the Railway Adjustment Board final and binding upon the parties;
13
(2) the holding of Lincoln Mills that the procedural requirements of
section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia may be avoided in a suit under 301 to
compel arbitration does not mean that the express prohibition in
7id. at 384.
8Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. M.-K.-T. R.R.. 363 U.S. 528 (196o);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n,
300 U.S- 515 (1937).
9Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958). This
section states generally that no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be
issued except after testimony in open court and unless the following facts are
found: (a) unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed or have
been committed and will continue; (b) substantial and irreparable injury to com-
plainant's property will result; (c) greater harm will be inflicted upon the com-
plainant by denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting
of relief; (d) complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (e) puplic officers
charged with the duty of protecting complaint's property are unable or unwilling
to furnish adequate protection.
"353 U.S. 448 (1957)-
uld. at 455; Accord, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
567 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 n.4 (196o).
U288 F. Supp. 382, 383 (E.D. La. 196o).
"Ibid.
o 6I (,ISE (.OAIAIENT"S
section 4 of the Act may be avoided in order to enjoin a peaceful
strike in violation of a contract; 14 (3) even if the arbitration clause
is the quid pro quo for the no-strike dause, this does not mean that
the latter is specifically enforceable; 15 the employer's remedy is in
damages for breach of contract.
16
The District Court also noted that the Supreme Court has not yet
been faced with the problem presented in the principal case and that,
thus far, two circuits have differed on the issue.17 The court finally
concluded that, even if such an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is desirable, "it could not presume to ignore the plain mandate
of applicable statutes in order to achieve a result in accord with its
private view of what the law ought to be. Perhaps that privilege
belongs to a higher court. Or perhaps Congress itself should be per-
mitted to do its own legislating." Is
If the intent of Congress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act and the
subsequent language of the Supreme Court in the Lincoln Mills case
are not to be dismissed lightly, then the reasoning of the court in
Baltimore Contractors is questionable. The Lincoln Mills case pointed
out that according to section 3oi the courts are to play a vital part
in the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts.19 Arbitration
clauses were held to be specifically enforceable in order to promote
better stability in labor relations and to avoid economic warfare
between management and unions. Thus, both parties can be required
to perform their contracted obligations because, if such were not the
case, there would be little reason for the existence of a contract.
Since the failure to arbitrate was not one of the abuses at which Norris-
LaGuardia was aimed, the Supreme Court held that the procedural
requirements of section 7 of that Act could be dispensed with, and
a mandatory injunction could be issued compelling arbitration.
The court in Baltimore Contractors relied on the Second Circuit
case of A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union2 0 to support its
position that the no-strike agreement was not specifically enforceable
notwithstanding the strong precedent set by Lincoln Mills. The court




17A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 25o F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957); Chauf-
feurs Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1g6o).
Is88 F.2d 384 (E.D. La. 1950).
'0353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"-'25o F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957).
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LaGuardia Act existed, that the strike could not be enjoined, and
that money damages was a sufficient remedy for the employer.
21
In deciding that section 3o of Taft-Hartley is not an implied excep-
tion to section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia prohibiting the granting of in-
junctions in labor disputes, it was reasoned that since Congress did
not expressly withdraw the restrictions of Norris-LaGuardia in en-
acting 3o such a withdrawal could not be implied because, in other
sections of the same Act,22 Congress had expressly lifted the Norris-
LaGuardia bar to give the courts injunctive power when the National
Labor Relations Board initiates proceedings.23 There is ample pre-
cedent available, however, to show that such rules of construction
have seldom been strictly followed in cases wherein the Norris-La-
Guardia Act is involved. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
held the Act to be repealed by implication where such a holding
will facilitate the effective enforcement of a labor statute.24 In the
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R.25 case, the
most analogous of the Railway Labor Act cases, injunctive relief was
given by the Supreme Court where a union resorted to a strike over
matters pending before the Railway Adjustment Board. The court
reconciled the two statutes "so that the obvious purpose in the en-
actment of each is preserved." 26 It further stated that the obvious
purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was:
"[T]o protect working men in the exercise of organized, econom-
ic power, which is vital to collective bargaining. The Act aimed
to correct existing abuses of the injunctive remedy in labor dis-
putes.... Congress acted to prevent the injunctions of the
federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the com-
peting economic forces of labor and capital."
27
Enjoining a strike where there is a suitable and agreed upon method
of settling the dispute is "not the same as... [one] in which the in-
21Id. at 331.
- Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 1oi(h), 20o8(b), 302(e), '17 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§§ i6o(b), 17 8(b), 186(e) (1958).
2"[I]t is an accepted canon of construction that repeals by implication are not
favored, especially where the previous statute (the Norris-LaGuardia Act) is not
stale or forgotten, but is a 'significant and tremendously important piece of legisla-
tion, which the Congress evidently had specifically in mind when it came to enact
the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947." 250 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1957).
2Cases cited note 8 supra.




junction strips labor of its primary weapon without substituting any
reasonable alternative."
2 ,8
The same policy conflict that was found to exist between the
blanket restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the more
specific Railway Labor Act also exists between the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and section 301 of Taft-Hartley. In direct conflict with the Bull
case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Chauffeurs Union
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines29 granted injunctive relief. The
court interpreted the Lincoln Mills holding as going beyond the mere
enforcement of arbitration clauses in labor contracts:
"Rather, we think the court had in mind a much broader con-
cept of jurisdictional authority-one which embraced all vio-
lations of labor contracts which had been freely arrived at
through the collective bargaining process. This broader juris-
dictional concept is evidenced by the court's cognizance of
Congressional concern for union responsibility for its collective
bargaining contracts, and with 'procedure for making such
agreements enforceable in the courts by either party' in ac-
cordance with the usual processes of the law."3 0
The court added that it is one thing to use the injunction to defeat
or restrain the full use of economic bargaining power by a union but it
"is quite another to utilize the judicial processes to preserve and
vouchsafe the fruits of a bargain which the parties have freely arrived
at through the exercise of collective bargaining rights." 31
The validity of the philosophy underlying the Norris-LaGuardia
Act must be questioned in the light of present economic conditions
and the congressional policy of enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. The Norris-LaGuardia Act has been said to mark the
epitome of the philosophy that the civil law through the use of the
injunction had no useful function in the field of labor relations.32
The principal objective of the Act, therefore, was to prohibit the
abuse of the labor injunction as a means of curtailing the effective
use of economic bargaining power in the collective bargaining pro-
cess.33 As long as no fraud, violence or intimidation was involved,
2Id. at 41.
--282 F.2d 345 (0oth Cir. 196o).
*11d. at 349.
31d. at 350.
=Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1484-85
(1959); Cox, Current Probems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 3o Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 247, 253 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Current Problems]; Com-
ment, 70 Yale L.J. 7o, 96 (ig6o).
=Comment, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 496, 503 (1958).
i96i]
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the results of collective bargaining were to be left to the competitive
economic struggle between management and labor.3 4 As a result, "the
Act was drafted in sweeping terms, with the consequent effect of pro-
hibiting practically all injunctions in labor disputes, including all
injunctions against peaceful strikes."3 5 In 1932 when the Act was
promulgated, the legal enforcement of a collective bargaining con-
tract was not considered vital to effective bargaining, 6 and it is doubt-
ful if the Congress of that year ever had in mind a suit for an in-
junction based on a contract.3 7 Section 4 of the Act which clearly pro-
hibits enjoining a peaceful strike makes no distinction between tort
and contract actions.3 8 According to the National Labor Relations
Act, the Labor Management Relations Act and the 1934 amendments
to the Railway Labor Act, a collective bargaining agreement imposes
contractual duties and obligations on both employers and unions. 9
In view of this policy it would seem that the blanket restrictions of
section 4 are anachronistic.
4 0
While section 3Ol of Taft-Hartley does not specify a remedy in
a suit for breach of the labor contract, an injunction is really the
only practical and efficient form of relief against a strike.41 Damages
are inadequate since the injury to the business cannot be measured
accurately.4 2 Moreover, the best interests of labor-management rela-
tions are not served by forcing an employer, after the strike, to sue a
union consisting of his employees. 43 The suggested remedy that the
union be compelled to arbitrate while remaining on strike seems un-
satisfactory because "the atmosphere of strife and emotionalism sur-
rounding a strike would greatly detract from the effectiveness of the ar-
bitration procedure and render compliance with the award unlikely."
44
'Cox, Current Problems, 3o Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247, 253-54 (1958); Note, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 354, 356 (1958).
6Comment, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 496, 503 (1958).
3OCox, Current Problems, 3o Rocky Mt. Law Rev. 247, 255 (1958); Comment,
70 Yale L.J. 7o, 96 (1960).
'Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 354, 365 (1958)-
3Ibid.
-Id. at 356; Comment, 70 Yale L.J. 70, 96 (1960).
'0Cox, Current Problems, 3o Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247, 254 (1958); Note, 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 354, 365 (1958).
" Cox, Current Problems, 3o Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247, 255 (1958).
42Ibid.
"Ibid.
4'Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 354, 365 (1958). "Many arbitrators will decline to hear
a dispute while a strike is in progress. And the pressure upon an arbitrator who
does act under strike circumstances is sufficient to raise grave doubts about the
fairness of the proceeding itself." Mendelsohn, Enforcement of Arbitration Agree-
ments Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 Yale L.J. 167, i8o n.57 (1956).
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Thus, injunctive relief under 301 appears to be the most adequate
remedy.
45
The holding in the Baltimore Contractors case creates a situation
in which union responsibility under collective bargaining is decreased
and is in direct conflict with the policy of section 301.46 Under 3oi a
union has a quick and simple remedy for the failure of an employer
to arbitrate. If the injunction is prohibited, no such remedy exists
for an employer where a union has failed to abide by its agreement
not to strike. It appears, therefore, that the court in the principal
case missed an opportunity to perpetuate and strengthen the existing
national policy in regard to the enforcement of labor-management
contracts. 4 7 To rule that a strike in violation of a no-strike agreement
could be enjoined under 3o of Taft-Hartley would admittedly "re-
quire strong judicial creativity' in the face of the plain meaning of
section 4 [of Norris-LaGuardia] ... "4 but absent an act of Congress
"it is the only way to eliminate an anachronistic incongruity between
two statutes which ought to form a coherent whole." 49
RAYMOND R. ROERFCHT, JR.
4A breach of contract is not per se an unfair labor practice. Thus, it follows
that an employer is not guaranteed protection under the Norris-LaGuardia Act
by filing unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
See, e.g., Old Line Life Ins. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951). But see Westmoreland
Coal Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), involving a strike over an arbitrable dispute and
Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), involving a strike over dis-
satisfaction with an arbitration award. Both strikes were held to be attempts to
modify existing bargaining contracts and so enjoinable by the Board as unfair
labor practices under § 8(d) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
4cSee Comment, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 496, 504 (1958).
'The role of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in relation to injunctive relief in state
courts has not been decided by the Supreme Court and is beyond the scope of this
comment. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court of California up-
held the granting of injunctive relief by a state court in McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957). Such relief
was held justifiable despite the fact that a suit for violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement could have been brought in a federal court and that the federal
court would have been precluded from issuing an injunction. While such a view
could lead to a diversity of results among the states and would conflict with the
uniformity of labor law policy advocated in Lincoln Mills, it seems likely that
emplo)ers, denied injunctive relief in federal courts, will seek such aid in state
courts. This points up the necessity for injunction in federal courts as a remedy
against a strike under section 3oi.
'Cox, Current Problems, 3o Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247, 256 (1958).
491Ibid.
i96i]
